HIV and AIDS is a global epidemic

When AIDS first started, no one could have predicted how the epidemic would spread across the world and how many millions of lives it would change. There was no real idea what caused it and consequently no real idea how to protect against it.
Now we know from bitter experience that HIV is the cause of AIDS and that it can devastate families, communities and whole countries. We have seen the epidemic knock decades off countries' national development, widen the gulf between rich and poor nations and push already stigmatised groups closer to the margins of society. We are living in an 'international' society, and HIV has become the first truly 'international' epidemic, easily crossing oceans and borders.
However, experience has also shown us that the right approaches, applied quickly enough with courage and resolve, can and do result in lower national HIV infection rates and less suffering for those affected by the epidemic. We have learned that if a country acts early enough, a national HIV crisis can be averted.
It has been noted that a country with a very high HIV prevalence will often see this eventually stabilise, and even decline. In some cases this indicates, among other things, that people are beginning to change risky behaviour patterns, because they have seen and known people who have been killed by AIDS. It can also indicate that a large number of people are dying of AIDS.
Already, more than 30 million people around the world have died of AIDS-related diseases.¹ In 2010, 2.7 million people were newly infected with HIV, and 1.8 million men, women and children died of AIDS-related causes. 34 million people around the world are now living with HIV.²

Africa

It is in Africa, in some of the poorest countries in the world, that the impact of HIV has been most severe. At the end of 2009, there were 9 countries in Africa where more than one tenth of the adult population aged 15-49 was infected with HIV.³ In three countries, all in the southern cone of the continent, at least one adult in five is living with the virus. In Botswana, 24.8% of adults are now infected with HIV, while in South Africa, 17.8% are infected. With a total of around 5.6 million infected, South Africa has more people living with HIV than any other country.⁴

A mural in Ghana challenging HIV-related stigma

Rates of HIV infection are still extremely high in sub-Saharan Africa, and an estimated 1.9 million people in this region became newly infected in 2010.⁵ This means that there are now an estimated 22.9 million people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. In this part of the world women are disproportionately at risk, accounting for 59% of all people living with HIV in the region.⁶ As the number of people living with HIV in the general population rises, the same patterns of sexual risk result in more new infections simply because the chances of encountering an infected partner become higher.
Although West Africa is less affected by HIV infection, the number of people living with HIV is reaching extremely high numbers in some of the larger countries. An estimated 3.3 million adults and children are living with HIV in Nigeria, accounting for nearly 10% of the global number of people living with HIV.⁷ Another country particularly affected by HIV in West Africa is Cote d’Ivoire, where 450,000 people are living with HIV.⁸
Whilst the number of people living with HIV remains high in sub-Saharan Africa, rapid scale up of antiretroviral treatment has been associated with a significant decline the number of new HIV infections across a number of countries in this region.⁹ In 2010, 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa reported a decline in HIV incidence. However, despite an increasing number of countries in the region achieving universal access to treatment, under half of those in need of antiretroviral treatment in this part of the world were receiving it at the end of 2009.¹⁰
Prevention campaigns and the number of AIDS related deaths also have a notable impact on a country’s HIV prevalence. In Uganda the estimated prevalence fell to around 7% in 2001 from a peak of about 15% in the early 1990s, by 2009 prevalence was 6.5%.¹¹ The decrease in HIV prevalence in the 1990s is thought in part to have resulted from strong prevention campaigns although it could also have been associated with a vast number of people dying from AIDS.¹²
It is widely thought that North Africa managed to sidestep the global AIDS epidemic - perhaps due to its strict rules governing sexual behaviour. However, the latest UNAIDS estimates indicate that 59,000 people in North Africa and the Middle East acquired an HIV infection in 2010, bringing the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the Middle East and North Africa to an estimated 470,000.¹³ A further 35,000 people died from AIDS in this region in 2010.

back to top Asia

The diversity of the AIDS epidemic in Asia is even greater in Asia than in Africa. Half of the world's population lives in Asia, so even small differences in the infection rates can mean huge increases in the absolute number of people infected.
The total number of people living with HIV in Asia is thought to be nearly 4.8 million.¹⁴ Around half (2.4 million) of these were in India followed by China (740,000), Thailand (530,000) and Myanmar (240,000).¹⁵

HIV positive migrant workers in Mumbai, India

National adult prevalence is under 1% in all Asian countries except Thailand. However some of the countries in this region are very large and national averages may obscure serious epidemics in some smaller provinces and states. For example, five provinces account for more than half of people living with HIV in China.¹⁶
In most Asian countries the epidemic is centred among particular high-risk groups, particularly men who have sex with men, injecting drug users, sex workers and their partners. However the epidemic has already begun to spread beyond these groups into the wider population. Some Asian countries, such as Thailand, responded rapidly to the epidemic with extensive campaigns to educate the public and prevent the spread of HIV – and have succeeded in cutting prevalence. Other very populous regions, such as China, have only recently admitted that the spread of HIV threatens their populations, and as a result their prevention work is lagging behind the spread of the virus.
The epidemic in Asia has ample room for growth. The sex trade and the use of illicit drugs are extensive, and so are migration and mobility within and across borders. The fluidity in international markets has erupted into non-stop movement within countries and among countries, facilitating the spread of HIV. India, China, Thailand and Cambodia, to name only a few, have highly mobile populations within their borders, with people moving from state to state and from rural to urban areas.

back to top Eastern Europe & Central Asia

The AIDS epidemic in Eastern Europe & Central Asia is rapidly increasing, with a rise of around 250 percent in the total number of people living with HIV since 2001. In 2010, some 1.5 million people were living with HIV, compared to 410,000 in 2001.¹⁷ AIDS claimed an estimated 90,000 lives during 2010, over ten times 2001's figure.¹⁸
In any country where rates of injecting drug use and needle sharing are high, a fresh outbreak of HIV is liable to occur at any time. This is especially true of the countries in Eastern Europe where the HIV epidemics are still young and have so far spared some cities and sub-populations. Heroin smuggled into the West crosses through a number of Eastern European countries, and its path is marked by a high concentration of injecting drug users, and a high HIV prevalence.
The Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are the worst affected, although HIV continues to spread in Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan, and more recent epidemics are emerging in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. An estimated 980,000 HIV-infected people were living in the Russian Federation at the end of 2009. However, as reporting of HIV cases in many areas of Russia is at best patchy, it is difficult to determine a precise figure.¹⁹ The epidemic in Eastern Europe is primarily driven by injecting drug use, and the criminalisation of this practice makes it difficult to gain an accurate picture of the proportion of drug users who are living with HIV. However, reports from St Petersburg, Russia, indicate that HIV prevalence has seen a significant rise; particularly among injecting drug users, among whom HIV prevalence is estimated at almost 60 percent.²⁰

back to top Caribbean

AIDS activists in Haiti

Outside sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean has the highest HIV prevalence. In the most affected countries of the Caribbean, the spread of HIV infection is driven by unprotected sex between men and women, although infections associated with injecting drug use are common in some places, such as Puerto Rico.
The Bahamas is the worst affected nation in the region, with a prevalence of 3%.²¹ Haiti, where the spread of HIV may well have been fuelled by decades of poor governance and conflict, has also been hard hit by the AIDS epidemic. An estimated 1.9% of Haitian adults were living with HIV at the end of 2009, though rates vary considerably between regions. HIV transmission in Haiti is overwhelmingly heterosexual, and both infection and death are concentrated in young adults. Many tens of thousands of Haitian children have lost one or both of their parents to AIDS. Among pregnant women in urban areas, HIV prevalence appears to have fallen by half between the mid-1990s and 2003-2004. Probably much of this decline is due to an increase in the AIDS death rate, though behaviour change might also have played a part. Whilst HIV incidence has reduced by around 12 percent since 2001, there is still an urgent need for intensified prevention efforts in Haiti.²²
AIDS is now high on the agendas of many governments in this region, as they are beginning to notice the significant impact of the epidemic on their medical systems and labour force. Cuba's comprehensive testing and prevention programmes have helped to keep its HIV infection rate below 0.1%, and the country provides free HIV treatment to all those in need. In 2002, the Pan Caribbean Partnership Against HIV/AIDS (PANCAP) signed a deal with six pharmaceutical companies which lowered prices for ARVs and led to wider access to treatment. In 2009, 48% of those in need of treatment in the Caribbean were receiving it.²³

back to top Latin America

Around 1.5 million people were living with HIV in Latin America at the end of 2010. During that year, around 67,000 people died of AIDS and an estimated 100,000 were newly infected.²⁴ The HIV epidemics in Latin America are highly diverse, and are fuelled by varying combinations of unsafe sex (both between men, and between men and women) and injecting drug use. In nearly all countries, the highest rates of HIV infection are found among men who have sex with men, and the second highest rates are found among female sex workers.
The Central American nation of Belize has a well-established epidemic, with the adult HIV prevalence above 2%. The virus is mainly spread through unprotected sex, particularly commercial sex and sex between men.
Commercial sex and sex between men are the major drivers of smaller epidemics elsewhere in Central America, where national HIV prevalence varies between 0.2% and 1%. Men who become infected via these routes are likely to pass the virus on to their wives and girlfriends.

Jorge Saavedra, head of Mexico's HIV prevention agency

Brazil had an adult HIV prevalence between 0.3 and 0.6% at the end of 2009, but, because of its large overall population, this country accounts for nearly half of all people living with HIV in Latin America. In Brazil, heterosexual transmission, injecting drug use and sex between men account for roughly equal numbers of infections.²⁵
HIV in Argentina was initially seen as a disease of male injecting drug users and men who have sex with men. Now the virus is spread mostly through heterosexual intercourse, and is affecting a rising number of women. The other Andean countries are currently among those least affected by HIV, although risky behaviour has been recorded in many groups.
One of the defining features of the Latin American epidemic is that several populous countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, are attempting to provide antiretroviral therapy to all those who need it. The governments of these countries have encouraged local pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce cheaper generic copies of patented medicines. This allows them to distribute drugs to a much greater proportion of their population that they would otherwise be able to help.
Treatment coverage still varies widely, but these efforts are having a definite impact. While they are improving both the length and the quality of people's lives, they are also increasing the proportion of people living with HIV, and thus HIV prevalence figures.

back to top High-income countries

In high-income nations, HIV infections have historically been concentrated principally among injecting drug users and gay men. These groups are still at high risk, but heterosexual intercourse accounts for a growing proportion of cases. In the United States, a quarter of people diagnosed with AIDS in 2008 were female, and three quarters of these women were infected as a result of heterosexual sex.²⁶ In several countries in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, heterosexual contact is the most frequent cause of newly diagnosed infections. In 2010, the number of people living with HIV in North America and Western and Central Europe reached an estimated 2.2 million.²⁷
Very early in the epidemic, once information and services for prevention had been made available to most of the population, the level of unprotected sex fell in many countries and the demand rose for reproductive health services, HIV counselling and testing and other preventive services.
Prevention work in high-income countries has declined, and sexual-health education in schools is still not universally guaranteed, in spite of the fact that the risks of HIV are well-known to governments. Political factors have been allowed to control the HIV prevention work that is done, and politicians are commonly keen to avoid talking about any sexual issues. Furthermore, it is very hard to show that a number of people are not HIV positive who otherwise would be – and politicians like the electorate to see results.
Among gay men, the virus had spread widely before it was even identified and had established a firm grip on the population by the early 1980s. With massive early prevention campaigns targeted at gay communities, risk behaviour was substantially reduced and the rate of new infections dropped significantly during the mid- and late 1980s. Recent information suggests, however, that risky behaviour may be increasing again in some communities. People think that the danger is over because of lack of media coverage of the issues around HIV and AIDS - and many new infections continue to occur.
Some communities and countries have initiated aggressive HIV prevention efforts, particularly among high-risk groups such as injecting drug users. But in many places the political cost of implementing needle exchange and other prevention programmes has been considered too high for them to be started or maintained.
Many high-income countries suffer from the belief that HIV is something that affects other people, not their own populations. On a national level, this belief prevents policy makers and budget setters from seeing the epidemic on their own doorsteps, looking instead to the situation in areas such as Africa. Some high-income countries fund medication provision for low-income countries whilst failing to provide medicines for their own citizens who have HIV/AIDS. For example, many people cannot afford HIV treatment in America.

back to top Where do we go from here?

Spending

Significant money is being spent particularly on providing treatment for HIV/AIDS, but there are large numbers of people still needing treatment and funding from many organisations including the Global Fund and PEPFAR, is either being reduced or at best is staying the same.

Prevention and education

HIV education has already been proved to be effective and necessary, both for people who are not infected with HIV - to enable them to protect themselves from HIV - and for people who are HIV positive - to help them to live with the virus. There is a huge wealth of educational resources available around the world, and yet in many places people still lack the knowledge they need to protect themselves.
HIV and AIDS prevention is possible, but to avoid HIV infection people need more than just factual information. People must be able to negotiate safe and responsible sexual relationships; gender inequalities must be confronted; and those who choose to have sex need access to condoms. Needle exchanges should be encouraged, as they have proven highly effective at preventing HIV transmission among injecting drug users.

Medication

Antiretroviral medication has been available through public health programmes since the first few years of the 20th century in high prevalence countries, mainly thanks to generic drugs. However, there must be increasing access to HIV treatment if millions of more deaths are to be avoided. Along with the actual availability of drugs, one of the greatest challenges is a shortage of health workers to carry out HIV tests, administer the medicines, and teach people how to use them.

  Conclusion

HIV is recognised as a global threat, and funding and resources for the HIV epidemic have increased significantly since the 1990s. However, the global economic recession has led to declining financial commitment.²⁸ Moreover, the availability of treatment is being outpaced by the rate of new infections; two people are infected with HIV for every one put on treatment.²⁹ Much has been achieved but the momentum must be maintained or the hard-won achievements of the past two decades risk being reversed.
In 2011, world leaders gathered to restate their commitment to ending the HIV and AIDS epidemic worldwide. In the Political Declaration, they stated...

“HIV and AIDS constitute a global emergency, pose one of the most formidable challenges to the development, progress and stability of our respective societies and the world at large and require an exceptional and comprehensive global response”³⁰

 ^{http://www.avert.org/aroundworld.htm}

India needs high GDP growth to reduce poverty at faster pace By PTI Dec 01 2012 , New Delhi Tags: Economy

India needs high GDP growth to reduce poverty at faster pace

By PTI Dec 01 2012 , New Delhi

Tags: Economy

The reduction in poverty will be slower if the economic growth is not brought back on high growth track, said Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia.

"If we don't bring the GDP growth back (on track) up, the rate of poverty reduction will go down," Ahluwalia said during panel discussion here.

He further said that the GDP growth in the first half of the year (2012-13) is 5.4 per cent and if this would continue then we would have a very poor performance (this fiscal)."

This rate was lower than the 7.3 per cent clocked in April-September period in 2011-12.

According to the Planning Commission estimates, the rate of poverty reduction was 0.8 percentage point per year during 10 years till 2004. This shot up to two percentage point per year during the seven year till 2011.

"If you look at the last seven years, between since 2004 and 2011, percentage of people below the poverty line declined by two percentage point per year. In the 10 years before 2004-05, the poverty was declining at the rate of 0.8 percentage point every year," he said.

According to Ahluwalia, higher growth has resulted in a quantum jump in the real wages during the 11th Five Year Plan spanning from 2007 to 2012.

"In the period after 2007, real wages have gone four times faster than in the previous period. It is simply not correct that nobody is benefiting (because of high economic growth)," he said.

He said that in the last seven years, the government has done a good job as rate of poverty reduction has been high amid good growth in GDP.

Inclusive growth in India would be possible only when people have higher income levels and as a result they will get social justice, Ahluwalia said.

He also underlined the need for upgrading skills of people so that they can get higher income jobs in non-agriculture areas in rural areas.

From a high over 9 per cent GDP growth for many years prior to the 2008 crisis, the economy grew 6.5 per cent last year and is projected by analysts to slow down further to a decadal low of 5.5 per cent or even lower this fiscal.

Top 10 worst process safety incidents in history

This article discusses what the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas, consider the top 10 process safety incidents in history. The incidents were ranked based on the cumulative impact on loss of lives and economic losses, and the resulting impact on the development of what today we know as process safety.

1. Bhopal

On the early morning of December 3, 1984, at the Union Carbide plant in India, a storage tank containing methyl isocyanate (MIC) was contaminated with water leading to a runaway reaction causing the release of more than 40 tons of toxic MIC gas through a relief valve. The incident killed more than 3,000 people and injured hundreds of thousands more. This was arguably the worst chemical industry incident in terms of people affected, however; it was just after this fatal tragedy that the chemical process industry became really conscientious of the importance of process safety and it gained complete acceptance as a standard practice.¹ As a direct response to Bhopal, many regulatory initiatives were implemented worldwide. In India, this event led to the Environment Protection Act (1986), the Air Act (1987), the Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules (1989), the Public Liability Insurance Act (1991) and the Environmental Protection (Second Amendment) Rules (1992). In the US, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) was promulgated in 1986,² and the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) were signed into law in 1990.¹

2. Chernobyl

On April 28, 1986, in a power plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, an experiment performed in order to verify the emergency power supply of a reactor resulted in unfortunate consequences. The core of the reactor was blown out by two violent explosions causing a series of fires and the release of tons of radioactive materials. It is considered to be the worst nuclear disaster in history. The incident directly killed 56 people and influenced the development of cancer and radiation sickness of hundreds in the subsequent years.³ Before the incident, there were no written rules for the test that led to the catastrophic consequences. This fact has made the adherence to safety-related instructions as the most highlighted lesson learned regarding to process safety.⁴

3. Piper Alpha

Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform. On July 6, 1988, the backup condensate pump pressure safety valve was removed for routine maintenance. However, since the maintenance could not be completed within the shift, it was decided to complete the remaining work the next day. As a temporary measure, the condensate pipe was sealed with a blind flange. Communication gaps between different shifts resulted in a catastrophe when the night shift crew unknowingly started the backup condensate pump after the failure of the primary pump. In just 22 minutes, fire broke out everywhere and the event escalated further because of design and operational flaws resulting in 167 deaths. The Piper Alpha incident was a wakeup call for the offshore industries. Significant changes in safety practice include development and implementation of safety case regulations in UK, adherence to a permit-to-work system and realistic training for emergency response.⁴

4. The Macondo blowout

The Macondo exploration well located in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) was drilled by a deep water horizontal semi-submersible rig. On April 20, 2010, a blowout caused a fire and explosion on the rig that killed 11 employees and caused a major oil spill that continued uncontrolled for 87 days. A series of mechanical failures, lack of human judgment, faulty engineering design and improper team interaction came together to result in the largest oil spill known to mankind. The blowout was the biggest offshore incident in the US and it had a profound impact on safety regulations in the GoM. As a direct outcome of the Macondo incident, the Drilling Safety Rule regarding wellbore reliability and well control equipment was implemented on October 14, 2010. The Modified Workplace Safety Rule was also implemented on October 15, 2010, based on the lessons learned from the Macondo blowout.^5–6

5. BP Texas City

On March 23, 2005, during the startup of an isomerization unit, the safety relief valves of a distillation tower opened due to overfilling, allowing hydrocarbon liquids to flow into a disposal blowdown drum with a stack, which were also overfilled, resulting in a liquid release. The evaporation of the hydrocarbons produced a flammable vapor cloud that ignited and led to a series of fires and explosions. Fifteen workers died and about 180 were injured.⁷ This incident led to major investigations including the milestone Baker panel report headed by former US Secretary of State James Baker III. This incident also resulted in significantly more interest in and attention to issues such as facility siting, atmospheric venting, leading and lagging indicators and safety culture.

6. The Flixborough disaster

On June 1, 1974, in a caprolactam production plant, a temporary bypass line ruptured, resulting in the leak of almost 40 tons of cyclohexane that caused a huge vapor-cloud explosion. The tragic disaster killed 28 people including all the employees working in the control room. There was the alarming possibility of killing more than 500 employees if it were a normal working day instead of weekend. Also, widespread damage to property within a 6-mile radius around the plant was another major consequence. The Flixborough explosion was a critical driver in moving process safety issues forward in the UK. As a result of the Flixborough incident, at the end of 1974, the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) was formed. The lessons learned from this disaster highlight the importance of HAZOP analysis, blast resistant control rooms and thorough studies prior to any modification in process plants.⁴

7. Mexico City

On November 19, 1984, in an LPG installation in Mexico City, the failure of the safety valve of an LPG storage tank caused an overpressure inside the tank and a pipe rupture, leading to a leakage of LPG followed by an ignition and violent explosions. Approximately 500 people were killed and more than 700 were injured.⁹ This incident represents the largest series of boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs) in history.⁴ Mexico City clearly demonstrated the risk of BLEVEs in process facilities and lessons learned from this event have significantly impacted standards for design and operation.

8. Phillips

On October 23, 1989, in the Phillips 66 plant in Pasadena, Texas, the rupture of a seal on a polyethylene reactor caused the release of highly flammable ethylene and isobutene gas, forming a gas cloud and leading to a massive explosion in less than two minutes. Twenty-three people were killed and more than 300 injured. The day before the incident, a maintenance procedure had been performed by contractor personnel. This incident underscored the importance of rigid adherence to operating procedures and the implementation of an appropriate management system for contract workers. In response to this incident and other incidents that occurred before in the 1980s (including Bhopal, Shell Norco, Arco Channelview and Exxon Baton Rouge), the US Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration developed the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation.¹⁰

9. Columbia disaster

The physical cause of the Columbia shuttle disaster was separation of insulation foam that then hit the carbon–carbon reinforced panel of the left wing, thus damaging the thermal protection system. Aerodynamic pressure caused by superheated air destroyed the wing when the shuttle was reentering earth’s atmosphere at about 10,000 mph on February 1, 2003. The tragic incident caused the death of all seven astronauts and resulted in shuttle debris being scattered over 2,000 square miles in Texas. However, the underlying causes for the disaster can be traced back to flaws in decision making at NASA. The Columbia incident also provided important lessons for crisis communication professionals, as well. In fact, the lessons learned from the Columbia incident can be mapped to many other catastrophes such as the Piper Alpha or the Flixborough incident, covering issues such as sense of vulnerability, establishing an imperative for safety and valid on-time risk assessment.¹¹

10. Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident

On March 11, 2011, this incident drew the attention of the process and power industries around the world, encouraging them to incorporate natural disaster risk in any hazard analysis study. When a powerful earthquake hit the plant, the reactors shut down automatically. However, because of the earthquake and the following tsunami, a power blackout ensued, leading to the loss of cooling, which, in turn, led to overheating of the reactors (creating serious radiation hazards). Fortunately, no one was killed because of the radiation, but there may be long-term consequences to the workers and to the neighboring communities who were exposed to radiation.

Conclusions

These tragic events and the consequences of these events have provided us with numerous lessons that help our understanding of the hazards and risks of the modern process industry and, more importantly, how design, technology, equipment, management systems, human factors and safety culture can be used to improve the safety performance of the industry. Understanding the root causes of incidents and learning from mistakes within the company, as well as other organizations, is vital. These lessons need to be implemented both in the engineering and the management sectors.

LITERATURE CITED

¹ Mannan, M. S., et al., “The legacy of Bhopal: The impact over the last 20 years and future direction,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2005. 18(4–6): pp. 218–224.
² Mannan, M. S., J. Makris and H. J. Overman, Process Safety and Risk Management Regulations: Impact on Process Industry, Encyclopedia of Chemical Processing and Design, ed. R. G. Anthony, Vol. 69, Supplement 1, pp. 168–193, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 2002.
³ Dara, S. I. and J. C. Farmer, “Preparedness Lessons from Modern Disasters and Wars,” Critical Care Clinics, 2009. 25(1): pp. 47–65.
⁴ Mannan, M. S., Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3rd Edition, Elsevier, 2005.
⁵ McAndrews, K. L., “Consequences of Macondo: A Summary of Recently Proposed and Enacted Changes to US Offshore Drilling Safety and Environmental Regulation,” Society of Petroleum Engineers Americas E&P Health, Safety, Security and Environmental Conference, Houston 2011. Available online: http://www.jsg.utexas.edu/news/files/mcandrews_spe_143718-pp.pdf, accessed on March 16, 2012.
⁷ Kaszniak, M. and D. Holmstrom, “Trailer siting issues: BP Texas City,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 2008. 159(1): pp. 105-111.
⁸ Snorre, S., “Comparison of some selected methods for incident investigation,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 2004. 111(1–3): pp. 29–37.
⁹ C.M, P., “Analysis of the LPG-disaster in Mexico City,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 1988. 20(0): pp. 85-107.
¹⁰ Guidelines for Vapor Cloud Explosion, Pressure Vessel Burst, BLEVE, and Flash Fire Hazards, 2nd Edition, August 2010, Process Safety Progress, 2011. 30(2): p. 187.
¹¹ American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), Lessons from the Columbia Disaster-Safety and Organizational Culture, Center for Chemical Process Safety, 2005.

Print Article Share Add Comment Email Article A portrait of process safety: From its start to present day

By looking at the history of process safety and the improvements that each decade has brought in terms of regulations and techniques, industry can invariably make itself safer. Determining how major incidents such as Bhopal, Flixborough, Chernobyl, Piper Alpha and others have influenced the industry, academia, government and subsequent regulations can offer a firm foundation for future endeavors. There is still research needed in the near future to further cement the foundation, and researchers and process safety experts need to pay attention to what incidents of this millennium are telling us about what is still needed in order to make process safety second nature.

Background

The 19th century is known as the era of industrial revolution. Each technical progression has brought with it a certain amount of threat and hazardous activity. Chemical process safety was not a major public concern prior to almost the end of the 18th century. However, safety concerns were always there from the beginning of industrialization but not necessarily as we know or call it today. The primitive instinct of human beings to stay alive and protect themselves is probably the most visceral driver for the growth of process safety initiatives.¹

Process safety: An ongoing phenomenon

The driving force for process safety has been primarily based on catastrophic events. With an increasing number of tragic incidents, the process industry and governments started taking initiatives to minimize loss of life and property, as well as to protect the environment. In the US, safety regulations started back in 1899 when the US government issued the River Harbor Act to avoid excess dumping in waterways. At the beginning of the 19th century, especially in the mines, thousands of innocent lives were lost because of the hostile environment. The year 1910 was reported as the worst, with 1,775 deaths in mines.² These tragedies forced governments and local establishments to initiate regulatory regimes. In order to understand the growth of process safety, we have divided the significant initiatives and incidents into three broad sections. This categorization is based on the changes that took place between years 1930–1970, 1970–2000 and 2000–2012. This is shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Broad classification of process safety   development based on time period.

From 1930–1970. This period was mostly about establishing regulations. The Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act in 1936 in US restricted working hours and employing child labor.¹ This act also was concerned with occupational diseases, a basis of many present safety regulations. The 1947 presidential conference on industrial safety was another noteworthy step forward. Some other regulations were established in the years 1936–1969 (see Table 1). Individually, these acts did not have major impact in ensuring industrial safety but they played an imperative role for process safety to reach the position that it has achieved.


Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, which is a landmark legislation that put into motion programs that continue to evolve. Under this act, the Department of Health established the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) with wide-ranging authority to enforce safety and health standards to ensure a safer workplace.¹ Also, the US Department of Health and Human Services instituted the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) which had the responsibility to conduct research, provide recommendations to OSHA and train professionals for increasing awareness.¹ In addition, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in 1970 to address environmental issues.
From 1970–2000. In the 1970s and 1980s, some of the world’s most shocking and tragic industrial accidents took place. Consequently, industries and government bodies everywhere were forced to rethink about the technology and management systems in industries from the safety point of view. Fig. 2 offers a timeline of the catastrophes during this time period.

Fig. 2. Timeline of major industrial disasters   between 1974 and 1989.

The Flixborough explosion in 1974 was by far the most severe disaster in the UK chemical industries and proved to be a major driver for process safety issues in the UK. As a result of these initiatives, at the end of 1974, the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) was implemented. The impact of Flixborough was reinforced by that of the Seveso tragedy in 1976.³
However, the unforgettable Bhopal gas disaster in India on December 3, 1984, which resulted in varying estimates of 3,000 to upward of 20,000 fatalities and injuries to another 500,000, was a wake-up call for the chemical process industry. Both the industry and the public became aware of the potential hazard of chemical facilities.² This piloted the intensification of efforts within industry to ensure the safety of major hazard plants. Process safety finally gained absolute recognition as a standard practice. After the Bhopal tragedy, many regulatory initiatives were taken worldwide. In India, the Environment Protection Act (1986), the Air Act (1987), the Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules (1989), the Public Liability Insurance Act (1991) and the Environmental Protection (Second Amendment) Rules (1992) were promulgated.³
In 1984, the Mexico City disaster represented the largest series of boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs) in history that killed almost 500 people.³ The nuclear disaster which took place on April 28, 1986, in Chernobyl, Ukraine, killed 56 people and caused the development of cancer and radiation sickness in many.³ The Piper Alpha accident on July 6, 1988, resulted in 167 deaths. The Piper Alpha Inquiry has been of crucial importance in the development of the offshore safety regime in the UK sector of the North Sea. On October 23, 1989, in the Phillips 66 plant in Pasadena, Texas, a massive gas explosion caused the death of 23 people and more than 300 injuries. ³
These incidents made it even more evident that implementation of safety legislation was indispensably necessary. Table 2 and Table 3 show the significant legislative and regulatory steps taken in the US and Europe.

Process safety in the new millennium

Process safety has certainly made remarkable progress. However, it is still impossible to adequately answer a simple question, “Are we safe enough?” The incidents that occurred in this millennium are a reminder that process safety has a long way to go.
The Columbia disaster on February 1, 2003, caused the death of all seven astronauts onboard and scattered shuttle debris over 2,000 square miles of Texas.¹¹ This tragic incident can be traced back to flaws in decision making at NASA. The Columbia explosion was an important lesson for crisis communication professionals, as well. In fact, the NASA lessons can be mapped to many other catastrophes, such as the Piper Alpha or the Flixborough incidents, that reveal a sense of vulnerability, establish an imperative for safety, and reinforce the need for valid on-time risk assessments.¹¹
The Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) on April 20, 2010, killed 11 employees and led to an uncontrolled oil spill lasting 87 days.¹² This blowout was the most significant offshore incident in the US, and it had a profound impact on safety regulations in the GoM. The Drilling Safety Rule regarding well-bore reliability and well-control equipment was implemented on October 14, 2010. The Modified Workplace Safety Rule was put into place on October 15, 2010, based on the lessons learned from the Macondo blowout.
Finally, there was the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant incident in March 2011 that drew the attention of the global process and power industries, encouraging them to incorporate natural disaster risks in a hazard analysis study.¹²
Technical achievements pre-1970. Techniques to identify and evaluate hazards, calculate consequences and quantified event probabilities and risk (such as What-If, Checklist, HAZOP, Fault- and Event-Tree analyses) were developed in the middle of the 20th century. These developments occurred in some cases years or even decades before the well-known major incidents in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these catastrophic incidents reflected the need for more understanding and research regarding the underlying issues about process safety incidents. For example, the HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study, was developed by ICI in 1963, when a team was looking for ways to design a plant for phenol production with the minimum capital cost, but was considering possible deficiencies in the design.¹³ The Flixborough and Seveso incidents clearly showed the importance of identified hazards before fatal incidents occur, and HAZOP gained extensive popularity within operating and design companies. In the case of the Flixborough disaster, more than 40 tons of cyclohexane were released due to the rupture of a temporary bypass line. The temporary pipe was designed by a person who did not know how to design large pipes operating at high temperatures. After this incident, companies started to include procedures for management of change (MOC). Fault tree analysis (FTA) was developed in the early 1960s, and its use as a safety system and reliability technique quickly gained widespread interest, especially in nuclear and power installations. Since the development of FTAs, great efforts and advances (analytic methodologies, computer programs, computer codes) have occurred in the quantitative evaluation of fault trees.¹⁴
Technical achievements: 1970s and 1980s. In the US and Europe, models for pool formation, releases, evaporation and fire and explosions were refined in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.¹⁵ In these two decades, a series of fatal incidents (Fig. 3), reinforced the importance of these models and were one of the principal motivations for further research and improvements.

Fig. 3. Research motivated by major disasters   in the 1980s.

Bhopal increased substantially the interest and activity of the research and academic communities in a wide range of areas related with process safety,² principally in reactivity hazards (employees did not have knowledge of the reactivity of MIC mixed with water¹⁶), inherent safety and chemical releases. The 500 deaths involved in Mexico City clearly demonstrated the importance and hazards involved in BLEVEs.³ Piper Alpha focused attention on jet fires, pool fires, carbon monoxide fires (initial CO poisoning caused most of the deaths) and explosions in modules with turbulence generation.¹⁷ This incident, and the sinking of the Alexander L. Kielland in 1980, were the most important events in the history of offshore operations in Europe, and together made a great impact in the use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) techniques to assess offshore facilities.¹⁸
The aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster gave birth to the safety culture concept.¹⁹ According to the Phillips report,²⁰ the cause of the incident was a modification in a routine maintenance procedure. This reinforced to the process industry the importance of incorporating management systems, such as MOC procedures. The 1970s and 1980s were decades of major incidents and great losses, but there is no doubt that these two decades made a great impact on what today we call “process safety.”
Technical achievements: 1990s to present day. During the 1990s, in response to new regulations and regulatory initiatives, collection of incident history data started at a rudimentary level. Advances in technology and the research conducted by different centers, such as the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (which was established in 1995), allowed for the development and availability of increasingly reliable incident databases.²¹ In the late 1990s, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), in its MOC safety bulletin, highlighted the importance of having a systematic method for MOC, and how this is an essential ingredient for safe chemical process operations.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the development of engineered nano-materials increased considerably. This development introduced a new area of research to process safety, an area where researchers are trying to understand the workplace exposure and environmental aspect of nanotechnologies.

Research needed in the near future

There is no doubt that the field of process safety has made great advances in terms of regulation and techniques in the last 40 years, but industry changes every day, and more sophisticated and complex processes are developed. This, combined with factors such as human errors (which will be always present), and challenges in creating and maintaining organizational memory, among others, is the reason why incidents continue to occur. Fatal incidents in this new millennium highlighted some of the areas of process safety where research is still needed (Table 4).
Dust explosion. Dust explosion research has been conducted on and off for more than 100 years.²² However, events such as the Imperial Sugar Co. incident in Georgia (14 deaths, 14 life-threatening burns, 38 total injures²³) demonstrate the need for further research, awareness and management systems. In order to prevent these kinds of incidents, it is imperative to perform experimental and theoretical work to understand the chemistry and physics of dust cloud generation and combustion, flame propagation and potential ignition sources. It is also important to understand and develop models for fire and explosion of nano-materials.
Reactive chemicals. Reactive chemistry incidents continue to occur in the chemical processing industry, and in other industries which handle chemicals in their manufacturing processes. A CSB study, released in 2002, identified 167 reactive incidents that occurred between 1980 and 2001, which caused 108 deaths.²⁴ More experimental and theoretical research is necessary to fully understand the kinetics and thermal behavior of industrial chemical reactions.⁴
Safety culture. The tragic Columbia shuttle incident showed the possible fatal consequences of bad industrial communication. It is important that research and safety professionals understand and evaluate good safety culture that enables the sharing of information and improvement of safety within the industries, taking into account different specialties and environments.
Nuclear safety. The Fukushima incident definitely changed the risk perception of nuclear power plants. Managers and researchers have a long journey in both risk communication and risk assessment models of nuclear power plants.

Make safety second nature

Although “process safety” was not recognized as a practice or discipline before the mid-1980s, concern about the health, safety and environment is intrinsic in human beings and as old as civilization. Great advances in safety regulations and techniques have occurred during the last century. But as industry grows and changes every day, processes present new challenges. Managers, operators and researchers must continue working together to improve their overall safety knowledge in order to make safety second nature. HP

LITERATURE CITED

¹ Mannan, M. S., J. Makris and H. J. Overman, “Process Safety and Risk Management Regulations: Impact on Process Industry,” Encyclopedia of Chemical Processing and Design, ed. R. G. Anthony, Vol. 69, Supplement 1, Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 2002.
² Mannan, M.S., et al, “The legacy of Bhopal: The impact over the last 20 years and future direction,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2005.
³ Mannan, M.S., editor, Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volumes 1–3 (3rd Edition), Elsevier, 2005.
⁴ Qi, R., et al., “Challenges and needs for process safety in the new millennium,” Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2012.
⁵ Berger, S., History of AIChE’s Center for Chemical Process Safety, Process Safety Progress, 2009.
⁶ US Environmental Protection Agency, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) Enforcement,EPA 550-F-00-004, March 2000, available at: www.epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/chem/epcra.pdf, accessed on: March 15, 2012.
⁷ US Environmental Protection Agency, The Clean Air Act (1990), available online at: www.epa.gov/air/caa/, accessed on: March 15, 2012.
⁸ US Occupational Safety and Health Administration, ProcessSafety Management (PSM) 2010, available online at: www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3132.pdf, accessed on: March 15, 2012.
⁹ US Environmental Protection Agency, Risk Management Plan (RMP) Rule (updated 2009), available online at: www.epa.gov/osweroe1/guidance.htm#rmp, accessed on March 16, 2012.
¹⁰ Willey, R.J., D.A. Crowl and W. Lepkowski, “The Bhopal tragedy: Its influence on the process and community safety as practiced in the United States,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2005.
¹¹ American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), “Lessons from the Columbia Disaster—Safety and Organizational Culture,” Center for Chemical Process Safety 2005.
¹² McAndrews, K.L., “Consequences of Macondo: A Summary of Recently Proposed and Enacted Changes to US Offshore Drilling Safety and Environmental Regulation,” Society of Petroleum Engineers, Americas E&P Health, Safety, Security and Environmental Conference, Houston 2011. Available online at: www.jsg.utexas.edu/news/files/mcandrews_spe_143718-pp.pdf, accessed on March 16, 2012.
¹³ Kletz, T.A., Hazop—past and future. Reliability Engineering; System Safety, 1997.
¹⁴ Lee, W.S., et. al., Fault Tree Analysis, Methods, and Applications—A Review, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 1985.
¹⁵ Pasman, H. J., et. al., “Is risk analysis a useful tool for improving process safety?” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2009.
¹⁶ Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents (2nd Edition), Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE 2003. Available online at www.knovel.com/web/portal/browse/display?_EXT_KNOVEL_DISPLAY_bookid=931&VerticalID=0, accessed on March 16, 2012.
¹⁷ Crawley, F.K., “The Change in Safety Management for Offshore Oil and Gas Production Systems,” Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 1999.
¹⁸ Turney, R. and R. Pitblado, Risk assessment in the process industries, Institution of Chemical Engineers.
¹⁹ Pidgeon, N.F., “Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizations,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 1991.
²⁰ Company, P.P., A Report on the Houston Chemical Complex Accident, Bartlesville, Oklahoma, 1990.
²¹ Mannan, M. S., T. M. O’Connor and H. H. West, “Accident history database: An opportunity,” Environmental Progress, 1999.
²² Eckhoff, R.K., “Current status and expected future trends in dust explosion research,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2005.
²³ US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (US CSB), “Investigation Report on Sugar Dust Explosion and Fire,” Report No.2008-050I-GA, 2009. Available online at www.csb.gov/assets/document/Imperial_Sugar_Report_Final_updated.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2012.
²⁴ US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (US CSB), “Improving Reactive Hazard Management,” Report No. 2001-01-H, 2002. Available online at: www.csb.gov/assets/document/ReactiveHazardInvestigationReport.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2012.

The authors
	M. Sam Mannan, PhD, PE, CSP, is a chemical engineering professor and director of the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University. He is an internationally recognized expert on process safety and risk assessment. His research interests include hazard assessment and risk analysis, flammable and toxic gas cloud dispersion modeling, inherently safer design, reactive chemicals and run-away reactions, aerosols and abnormal situation management.
	Amira Y. Chowdhury, BS, is a PhD student in materials science and engineering, and a research assistant at the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University. She is a chemical engineer from the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology. Her research interests include hazard assessment and dust explosions.
	Olga J. Reyes-Valdes, BS, is a materials science and engineering PhD student at Texas A&M University and research assistant of the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center. She is a chemical engineer from Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia. Her research interests include reactive chemicals and run-away reactions, dust explosion, hazard assessment and risk analysis.

T

Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Bhopal Tragedy of 1984

Updated November 2010
1. What caused the gas leak?
2. Who could have sabotaged plant operations and caused the gas leak?
3. If sabotage is the suspected cause, why was this person not brought to justice?
4. Why has Carbide never disclosed the name of the employee that sabotaged the plant?
5. Were the valves on the MIC tanks at the plant "faulty"?
6. Were there safety concerns at the plant before the tragedy?
7. Why didn’t the plant’s safety systems contain the leak?
8. How do you respond to concerns expressed about the technologies used at the plant prior to the incident?
9. Who owned the Bhopal plant at the time of the incident and who owns it now?
10. Did Union Carbide India Limited abandon the Bhopal plant after the gas leak?
11. What did Union Carbide do to assist Bhopal victims after the gas leak?
12. How do you respond to assertions that Union Carbide would not share all its toxicological information on methylisocyanate (MIC) after the tragedy due to propriety concerns?
13. Were the environmental standards at the Bhopal plant inferior to those at Union Carbide's U.S. operations?
14. Is there groundwater contamination at the site?
15. Did the gas leak contaminate the groundwater and soil outside the plant?
16. Did the day-to-day operations of the plant contaminate the groundwater or soil outside the plant?
17. What remediation work has been performed at the site?
18. Why shouldn’t Union Carbide be responsible for the Bhopal site clean up under the “polluter pays” principle?
19. What about claims of contaminated groundwater outside the plant contaminating the adjoining region?
20. What is the status of litigation against Union Carbide regarding remediation of the site and/or paying additional restitution to victims?
21. What role has the Government of India played in the aftermath of the Bhopal tragedy?
22. Has the Government of India paid out the settlement money to the victims?
23. Media reports indicate that the victims are still suffering. What are you doing about this?
24. Where does responsibility lie for the clean up of the factory site in Bhopal and to address any on-going needs of the victims and their families?
25. Why haven’t Union Carbide and retired Chairman Warren Anderson appeared in the criminal proceedings in India?
26. Didn’t Dow inherit the Bhopal plant facility and liabilities for the Bhopal tragedy when it acquired the shares of Union Carbide Corporation?
27. What processes have been put in place industry-wide to prevent a tragedy like this from occurring again?

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1. What caused the gas leak?

Shortly after the gas release, Union Carbide launched an aggressive effort to identify the cause. An initial investigation by Union Carbide experts showed that a large volume of water had apparently been introduced into the methylisocyanate (MIC) tank. This caused a chemical reaction that forced the pressure release valve to open and allowed the gas to leak. A committee of experts working on behalf of the Indian government conducted its own investigation and reached the same conclusion. An independent investigation by engineering consulting firm Arthur D. Little determined that the water could only have been introduced into the tank deliberately, since process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident.
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2. Who could have sabotaged plant operations and caused the gas leak?

Investigations suggest that only an employee with the appropriate skills and knowledge of the site could have tampered with the tank. An independent investigation by the engineering consulting firm Arthur D. Little determined that the water could only have been introduced into the tank deliberately, since process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident.
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3. If sabotage is the suspected cause, why was this person not brought to justice?

The Indian authorities are well aware of the identity of the employee and the nature of the evidence against him. Indian authorities refused to pursue this individual because they, as litigants, were not interested in proving that anyone other than Union Carbide was to blame for the tragedy.
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4. Why has Carbide never disclosed the name of the employee that sabotaged the plant?

Union Carbide never publicly disclosed the name of the employee because it would serve no useful purpose; UC is not a governmental body and has no authority to “arrest” or “charge” anyone. However, the Indian Government, through its Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), had access to the same information as did Union Carbide. The CBI was well aware of the identity of the employee and the nature of the evidence against him. Indian authorities refused to pursue this individual because they, as litigants, were not interested in proving that anyone other than Union Carbide was to blame for the tragedy. The fact that employee sabotage caused the disaster under existing law would have exculpated Union Carbide. You may be interested to note that the CBI subjected the UCIL employee who found the local pressure indicator was missing on the morning after the incident (a key factor in UC's sabotage theory) to six days of interrogation to get him to change his story. That effort was unsuccessful.
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5. Were the valves on the MIC tanks at the plant "faulty"?

No. In fact, documented evidence gathered after the incident showed that the valve close to the plant's water-washing operation was closed and leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident.
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6. Were there safety concerns at the plant before the tragedy?

No. In 1982, a technical team from Union Carbide visited the Bhopal plant to conduct a routine process safety review, and identified some safety issues to be addressed by the plant. The plant addressed all of those issues well before the December 1984 gas leak. None of them had anything to do with the incident.
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7. Why didn’t the plant’s safety systems contain the leak?

Based on several investigations, the safety systems in place could not have prevented a chemical reaction of this magnitude from causing a leak. In designing the plant's safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in for two reasons:

1. The tank's gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the system; and

2. Process safety systems -- in place and operational -- would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident. The system design did not, however, account for the deliberate introduction of a large volume of water by an employee.

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8. How do you respond to concerns expressed about the technologies used at the plant prior to the incident?

Most of the attacks on the Bhopal plant's operation were made before the investigations were complete and often by people searching for a quick explanation for a terrible disaster. Critics' suggestions that three certain technologies may have been in use are incorrect. Two of the technologies (a carbon monoxide process and a MIC-to-Sevin process) were never used at the plant. A naphthol process developed by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) was shut down permanently in 1982, two years before the incident. None of them had anything to do with the incident. Employee sabotage – not faulty design or operation – was the cause of the tragedy.
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9. Who owned the Bhopal plant at the time of the incident and who owns it now?

The Bhopal plant was owned and operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), an Indian company in which Union Carbide Corporation held just over half of the stock. Indian financial institutions and thousands of private investors in India held the rest of the stock. In 1994, Union Carbide sold its entire interest in UCIL to Mcleod Russel India Limited, which renamed the company Eveready Industries India, Limited (Eveready Industries). In 1998, the Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owns and had been leasing the property to Eveready, took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any additional remediation.
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10. Did Union Carbide India Limited abandon the Bhopal plant after the gas leak?

No. UCIL, an Indian company, managed and operated the Bhopal plant on a day-to-day basis at the time of the gas leak. After the incident, UCIL completed one of the most single important remediation activities - the transformation and removal of tens of thousands of pounds of MIC from the plant. In the years following the tragedy, the Indian government severely restricted access to the site. UCIL was only able to undertake additional clean-up work in the years just prior to the sale, and spent some $2 million on that effort. The central and state government authorities in India approved, monitored and directed every step of the clean-up work.
We understand that, after the sale of UCIL stock in 1994, Eveready Industries continued the clean-up work at the site until 1998. That year, the Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owns and had been leasing the property to Eveready, took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any additional remediation. In 2004, a Public Interest Litigation was filed and is currently before the State of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jabalpur. One of the claims made in the litigation -- against the Union of India, the State of Madhya Pradesh and private companies allegedly responsible -- seeks remediation of the plant site. However, according to media reports, court-ordered remediation efforts directed at the government entities have proceeded slowly. For example, the media reported in 2007 that the Supreme Court of India had directed the central and state governments to pay for collection of waste on the site and to have it landfilled or incinerated, as appropriate. While some of the waste has been landfilled, public interest groups and the State of Gujarat, where the waste incineration facility is located, have challenged the incineration. Proposals made by private companies have similarly been questioned or rejected.
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11. What did Union Carbide do to assist Bhopal victims after the gas leak?

Immediately following the gas release, Union Carbide Corporation began providing aid to the victims and established a process to resolve their claims. Among the many efforts Union Carbide took to address the situation were:

• Organizing a team of top medical experts to help identify the best treatment options and work with the local medical community;
• Providing substantial amounts of medical equipment, supplies and expertise to the victims;
• Openly sharing all its information on methylisocyanate (MIC) with the Government of India, including all published and unpublished toxicity studies available at the time;
• Dispatching a team of technical MIC experts to Bhopal on the day after the tragedy, which carried MIC studies that were widely shared with medical and scientific personnel in Bhopal;
• Establishing a $100 million charitable trust fund to build a hospital for victims, and
• Offering a $2.2 million grant to establish a vocational-technical center in Bhopal to provide local jobs.

In 1989, Union Carbide and UCIL entered into a $470 million legal settlement with the Indian Government that settled all claims arising from the incident. The Indian Supreme Court affirmed the settlement and described it as "just, equitable and reasonable." Union Carbide and UCIL promptly paid the money to the Government of India. (Please see "The Incident, Response and Settlement" section of this website for additional information on UCC's efforts and contributions.)
An India media report in September 2006 stated that the "registrar in the office of Welfare Commissioner... said all cases of initial compensation claims by victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy have been cleared… With the clearance of initial compensation claims and revision petitions, no case is pending…"
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12. How do you respond to assertions that Union Carbide would not share all its toxicological information on methylisocyanate (MIC) after the tragedy due to propriety concerns?

This is a widespread misconception and is just not true. Union Carbide immediately accepted moral responsibility for the tragedy and gave all toxicity information on the chemicals involved in the manufacture of MIC to the Government of India immediately following the incident. Additionally, the government seized plant records after the tragedy and these also would have included all such information on MIC. On the day of the tragedy, Union Carbide dispatched a team of technical MIC experts, who carried MIC studies that were shared with medical and scientific personnel in Bhopal. UC experts provided all published and unpublished studies available at that time on MIC toxicity.
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13. Were the environmental standards at the Bhopal plant inferior to those at Union Carbide's U.S. operations?

No. To the contrary, the Bhopal plant design had the benefit of knowledge acquired from the operation of older chemical facilities. For example, as compared to other similar plants, Environmental Impact Assessment ratings for the Bhopal plant show favorable ratings in wastewater disposal and carbon monoxide emissions and, essentially, the same ratings as other similar plants for potential effects on human health.
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14. Is there groundwater contamination at the site?

According to media reports, various groups have made assessments of the groundwater quality at the Bhopal site through the years, including a recent effort supervised by the State of Madhya Pradesh. Questions regarding groundwater are best addressed by the State Government.
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15. Did the gas leak contaminate the groundwater and soil outside the plant?

No. Indian government authorities have publicly and repeatedly confirmed that no contamination of soil or groundwater outside the plant walls resulted from the gas leak.
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16. Did the day-to-day operations of the plant contaminate the groundwater or soil outside the plant?

No. A report issued by the India's National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) in 1997 found soil contamination within the factory premises at three major areas that had been used as chemical disposal and treatment areas. However, the study found no evidence of groundwater contamination outside the plant and concluded that local water-wells were not affected by plant disposal activities.
A 1998 study of drinking-water sources near the plant site by the Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board did find some contamination, but it was unrelated to the plant. The Control Board did not find any traces of chemicals linked to chemicals formerly used at the UCIL plant. Rather, the Control Board found that the contamination likely was caused by improper drainage of water and other sources of environmental pollution.
While we are aware of conflicting claims being made by various groups and reported in the media, we have no first-hand knowledge of what chemicals, if any, may remain at the site and what impact, if any, they may be having on area groundwater. The Hindustan Times reported on April 29, 2006, that “A study by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), Ahmedabad, has virtually debunked voluntary organizations' fear about contamination of water in and around Union Carbide plant….”
“...the report says that serum levels of pesticide residue (DDT & HCH) and mercury in the blood of people living adjacent to the plant are comparable with the level of these compounds reported from other parts of the country. It further said that the results of study showed that contents of VOCs [volatile organic compounds] i.e., benzene, toluene, xylene and cholorobenzene, in water samples were not detected and were found below the detection limit of the instrument, i.e., 2 ppm [parts per million]….”
“…MP [Madhya Pradesh] High Court is also seized of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) on the issue and has been monitoring progress of Union Carbide plant's cleaning up operation undertaken by the MP Pollution Control Board at its behest. Now, the State Government has filed the NIOH report in the High Court in support of its contention that hazardous wastes lying in the Union Carbide were not contaminating water….”
“…The NIOH team, in its report, has concluded that serum levels of DDT and HCH and mercury level in blood of people affected by contamination was comparable with the levels of these compounds from any other part of the country. ...Similarly, the levels of mercury in water and soil sample outside the UCIL compound and other locations were also comparable with the levels of mercury reported from other parts of the country....”
Furthermore, in a report to the State of Madhya Pradesh dated June 2010, India's NEERI concluded that the "groundwater in general is not contaminated due to seepage of contaminants from the UCIL" plant site. This conclusion is consistent with NEERI's earlier findings that all groundwater samples tested were within drinking water standards.
For additional information, contact the Madhya Pradesh State Government.
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17. What remediation work has been performed at the site?

UCIL was only able to undertake additional clean-up work in the years just prior to the sale (1994), and spent some $2 million on that effort. The central and state government authorities in India approved, monitored and directed every step of the clean-up work. We understand that, after UCC sold its stock in UCIL in 1994, the renamed company -- Eveready Industries -- continued the clean-up work at the site until 1998. That year, the Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owns and had been leasing the property to Eveready, took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any additional remediation.
In 2004, a Public Interest Litigation was filed and is currently before the State of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jabalpur. One of the claims made in the litigation -- against the Union of India, the State of Madhya Pradesh and private companies allegedly responsible -- seeks remediation of the plant site. However, according to media reports, court-ordered remediation efforts directed at the government entities have proceeded slowly. For example, the media reported in 2007 that the Supreme Court of India had directed the central and state governments to pay for collection of waste on the site and to have it landfilled or incinerated, as appropriate. While some of the waste has been landfilled, public interest groups and the State of Gujarat, where the waste incineration facility is located, have challenged the incineration.
Proposals made by private companies have similarly been questioned or rejected. For example, activist groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have protested against and repeatedly blocked remediation attempts by those who offered to help raise funds for clean up or to conduct pro-bono remediation. It's surprising that the very people who claim to have dedicated their lives to helping the people of Bhopal continue to block efforts to clean up the site.
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18. Why shouldn’t Union Carbide be responsible for the Bhopal site clean up under the “polluter pays” principle?

Union Carbide Corporation did not own or operate the site. If the court responsible for directing clean-up efforts ultimately applies the "polluter pays" principle, it would seem that legal responsibility would fall to Union Carbide India Limited, which leased the land, operated the site and was a separate, publicly traded Indian company when the Bhopal tragedy occurred. In 1994, Union Carbide sold its interest in Union Carbide India Limited with the approval of the Indian Supreme Court. The company was renamed Eveready Industries India Limited and remains a viable company today.
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19. What about claims of contaminated groundwater outside the plant contaminating the adjoining region?

While we are aware of conflicting claims being made by various groups and reported in the media, we have no first-hand knowledge of what chemicals, if any, may remain at the site and what impact, if any they may be having on area groundwater.
It is important to note, however, that a 1998 study of drinking-water sources near the plant site by the Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board did find some contamination that likely was caused by improper drainage of water and other sources of environmental pollution. The Control Board did not find any traces of chemicals linked to chemicals formerly used at the UCIL plant. And, the Hindustan Times reported on April 29, 2006, that "A study by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), Ahmedabad, has virtually debunked voluntary organisations' fear about contamination of water in and around Union Carbide plant…." (See Question 13 for more details.) We believe it is important for the Madhya Pradesh State Government to complete the remediation of the plant site. The State is in the best position to evaluate all scientific information that is available and make the right decision for Bhopal. For specific details, please contact the Madhya Pradesh State Government.
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20. What is the status of litigation against Union Carbide regarding remediation of the site and/or paying additional restitution to victims?

In 1989, Union Carbide and UCIL entered into a $470 million legal settlement with the Indian Government, settling all claims arising from the incident. The Indian Supreme Court affirmed the settlement and described it as "just, equitable and reasonable." Union Carbide and UCIL promptly paid the money to the Government of India. A lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in 1999 asserting claims for personal injuries and property damage arising out the Bhopal gas disaster was dismissed, and all subsequent appeals in the case have upheld the dismissal.
Other cases, filed in New York Federal court in November 2004, and thereafter, have focused on site remediation and compensation for residents. These cases have largely been rejected by the court. In June 2012, a Federal court unambiguously concluded that neither UCC nor its retired Chairman Warren Anderson are liable for any environmental remediation or pollution-related claims made by residents near the Bhopal plant site. However, plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals. A case, filed in March 2007, and making similar claims, has been stayed pending the resolution of the above-mentioned lawsuit.
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21. What role has the Government of India played in the aftermath of the Bhopal tragedy?

The Government of India entered into a settlement with Union Carbide Corporation and Union Carbide India Limited on behalf of the victims. The settlement resulted in a fund that determined eligibility and paid the victims; a government organization administered the fund. In its 1991 reaffirmation of the 1989 Bhopal settlement, the Indian Supreme Court required the Government of India to make up for any shortfall in the settlement account (see page 682, paragraph 198 of the Court’s ruling on Bhopal.com) and to acquire a medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 people who might later develop symptoms shown to have resulted from being exposed during the gas release (see pages 684-686, paragraph 205-208).
Therefore, any question regarding monetary reparations as a result of the Bhopal tragedy should be directed to the Government of India.
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22. Has the Government of India paid out the settlement money to the victims?

The Government of India (GOI) enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act in 1985, enabling the GOI to act as the sole legal representative of the victims in claims arising from or related to the Bhopal disaster. Pursuant to the settlement, therefore, the GOI assumed responsibility for disbursing funds from the $470-million settlement and providing medical coverage to citizens of Bhopal in the event of future illnesses.
In July 2004, fifteen years after reaching settlement, the Supreme Court of India ordered the Government of India to release all remaining settlement funds to the victims. Unfortunately, in April 2005, the Supreme Court of India granted a request from the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims and extended to April 30, 2006, the distribution of the rest of the funds by the Welfare Commission. News reports indicated that approximately $390 million remained in the fund at that time as a result of earned interest.
In September 2006, Indian media reported the registrar in the office of Welfare Commission said that "all cases of initial compensation claims by victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy…and revision petitions had been cleared; no case was pending…." If the media report was accurate, this could mean that all the settlement money has finally been distributed.
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23. Media reports indicate that the victims are still suffering. What are you doing about this?

UCC has contributed significantly in providing aid to the victims and has fulfilled every responsibility and obligation it had in Bhopal. For example, UCC paid the full settlement of $470 million to the Government of India in 1989, and also provided substantial monetary and medical aid to the victims, including establishing a charitable trust fund to which it paid approximately $100 million (including the proceeds of its sale of all its UCIL stock) to build a hospital that opened in Bhopal in 2000. (Please see “The Incident, Response and Settlement” section of this web site for additional information on UCC’s efforts and contributions.)

Pursuant to the settlement, the Government of India assumed responsibility for disbursing funds from the $470-million settlement and providing medical coverage to citizens of Bhopal in the event of future illnesses. In July 2004, fifteen years after reaching settlement, the Supreme Court of India ordered the Government of India to release all additional settlement funds to the victims. Unfortunately, in April 2005, the Supreme Court of India granted a request from the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims and extended to April 30, 2006, the distribution of the rest of the funds by the Welfare Commission. News reports indicated that approximately $390 million remained in the fund as a result of earned interest. In September 2006, India media reported that "registrar in the office of Welfare Commissioner... said that all cases of initial compensation claims by victims of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy had been cleared.... With the clearance of initial compensation claims and revision petitions, no case was pending...." We are encouraged by this report and hope that these funds will help alleviate any suffering being experienced by the victims and/or their families.
It is important to remember that when the Supreme Court of India affirmed the settlement in 1991, the Court also:

• Required the Government of India to purchase, out of the settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms; and
• Required the Government of India to make up any shortfall, however unlikely, in the settlement fund.

Furthermore, in 2007, the Supreme Court of India again reaffirmed the adequacy and finality of the 1989 settlement.
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24. Where does responsibility lie for the clean up of the factory site in Bhopal and to address any on-going needs of the victims and their families?

Responsibility for the clean-up of the Bhopal site lies with the Madhya Pradesh State government. In 1998, the Madhya Pradesh State Government, which owned and had been leasing the property to UCIL, took over the facility and assumed all accountability for the site, including the completion of any additional remediation. As owners of the site, the State is in the best position to evaluate all scientific information that is available, to complete whatever remediation may be necessary.
The central Government of India needs to address any ongoing concerns of the Bhopal people, thereby fulfilling the terms of the 1989 settlement and subsequent ruling upholding the settlement by the Indian Supreme Court in 1991.
Union Carbide's responsibility - along with the rest of the chemical industry - is to work hard every day to prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again.
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25. Why haven’t Union Carbide and retired Chairman Warren Anderson appeared in the criminal proceedings in India?

With regard to Bhopal litigation in India, all the key people from Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) -- officers and those who actually ran the plant on a daily basis -- have appeared to face charges, which were reduced to a misdemeanor status. Neither Union Carbide nor its officials are subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian court since they did not have any involvement in the operation of the plant.
By requirement of the Government of India, the plant was designed, owned, operated and managed on a day-to-day basis by UCIL and its employees.
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26. Didn’t Dow inherit the Bhopal plant facility and liabilities for the Bhopal tragedy when it acquired the shares of Union Carbide Corporation?

No. Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) owned, operated and managed on a day-to-day basis the Bhopal plant. UCIL was a publicly traded Indian company of which Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) owned 50.9 percent of the stock. Indian financial institutions and thousands of private investors in India owned the remaining stock. At the time of the incident, UCIL was one of the top 50 companies in India and had a 50-year history in the country.
UCIL still exists today. It underwent an ownership change in 1994 when UCC sold its interest in the company to Macleod Russel India Limited. The renamed company now is known as Eveready Industries India Limited. The proceeds from this sale were used to construct and fund a hospital in Bhopal for the ongoing care and treatment of those whose health was affected by the tragedy.
Today, UCC still remains a separate company, but its stock now is fully owned by The Dow Chemical Company. UCC had settled all civil claims related to the gas release with the Government of India and was no longer doing business in India when Dow acquired its shares in 2001. Dow did not inherit any liability from UCC.
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27. What processes have been put in place industry-wide to prevent a tragedy like this from occurring again?

Union Carbide, together with the rest of the chemical industry, has worked to develop and globally implement its “Responsible Care” program, designed to prevent any future events through improving community awareness, emergency preparedness and process safety standards. For more information on Responsible Care®, please visit www.responsiblecare.com or www.icca-chem.org (the web site of the International Council of Chemical Associations).
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