Report on the Deadly Texas Fertilizer Explosion -- It was Preventable

Report on the Deadly Texas Fertilizer Explosion -- It was Preventable

Posted by Timothy Landerville on Fri, Apr 25, 2014 @ 09:51 AM

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In the news: Blame has been assigned in the West, Texas fertilizer plant explosion that occurred one year ago in April 2013 where 14 lives were lost and 236 were wounded. Who was at fault, according to the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB)? Everyone. I said this a year ago while everyone was pointing fingers at each other in the article Quality Management: Risk Management and a Texas Fertilizer Plant. The CSB chairman of the board Rafael Noure-Eraso has now come out and said, "(The fire and explosion) resulted from the failure of a company to take the necessary steps to avert a preventable fire and explosion and from the inability of federal, state and local regulatory agencies to identify a serious hazard and correct it."
The federal agency interviewed West Fertilizer Co. employees and victims of the explosion and conducted studies of how the blast occurred. A fire at the plant led to conditions that caused the detonation of up to 34 tons of ammonium nitrate, a common fertilizer component and industrial explosive. The ammonium nitrate, which the company supplied to farmers to use as fertilizer in the region, was stored in wooden bins within a wooden building that did not have a sprinkler system.
Texas isn’t the only state with businesses at risk
Many U.S. fertilizer warehouses store ammonium nitrate in wooden bins, the board said.
Daniel Horowitz, the board's managing director added what some other experts have also said: The plant's storage of ammonium nitrate was potentially dangerous and West's firefighters and residents didn't realize how dangerous a fire there could be. For that reason the city zoned the area for homes, a school and a nursing home within what became the blast area.
While key questions remain unanswered, including the exact cause of the fire, "we know more than enough to keep this from happening again," Horowitz said. The investigation narrowed the possible causes of the plant fire to three things — a golf cart battery, an electrical system or a criminal act — but didn't go further.
EPA and OSHA share in the guilt
Besides the West Fertilizer Company both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration have regulatory oversight of fertilizer warehouses.
The CSB said OSHA needs to clarify standards governing the operation of ammonium nitrate storage facilities.
Moure-Eraso said he believes EPA has the authority to require the use of inherently safer technology in their operation.
A criticism was leveled against the CSB in error last year in the wake of the explosion. The Chemical Safety Board investigates explosions and fires at U.S. chemical plants. It has no regulatory or law enforcement authority, but makes recommendations to government and industry.
Any federal or state safety legislation enacted this past year
Have the state or U.S. government enacted more stringent regulations in this past year? No. Despite investigations that have yielded new information about safety deficiencies at the plant in West and voluntary safety steps taken by the fertilizer industry, there hasn't been a single state or federal law passed since the explosion requiring change.
Horowitz said several developments since the explosion have helped. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has issued guidelines for the storage of ammonium nitrate and the national industry group for fertilizer producers has created an organization that will offer voluntary inspections of U.S. dealerships.
"What we don't have at this point is any change whatsoever to federal or state mandatory codes," Horowitz said. "Without that, it's still permissible for a company to store ammonium nitrate in wooden bins. It's still permissible for ammonium nitrate to be stored near a school or a hospital."
Texas Two-Step two steps behind
Texas Fire Marshal Chris Connealy is traveling to small towns with ammonium nitrate storage facilities to discuss its safe handling and disaster preparation, and his office created a Web page where users can type in their zip codes to see if they live near a storage facility. It doesn't provide the names of facilities and has been little used thus far.
Connealy has said 46 facilities in Texas should be required to install sprinkler systems or retrofit buildings with non-combustible materials. He is working with state lawmakers on a potential bill to be considered by the Legislature when it reconvenes in January.
What’s it worth?
For now the question is who will be held accountable for the next fertilizer plant explosion? Given the quality management risk assessment section of ISO 9001, doesn’t it make better sense to become certified voluntarily rather than risk losing your business and the lives of others because of a risk like this? Had the business put money into voluntarily improving their containers and added water sprinklers, they would have lowered the risk considerably. In order to become ISO 9001 certified they would have been instructed to do just that.
I have spoken before about the difference between risk prevention and the cost of putting out continuous fires. West, Texas has learned this the hard way. It is better to learn from West than learn on your own. If you would like some assistance bringing your business up to code, please look at a sample of our quality management software.