A. WHY THIS REPORT, AND WHY NOW
·
Nuclear weapons are the most
inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill
and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. They are the only weapons ever
invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the
arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem of
nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity
– and much more immediate in its potential impact.
·
So long as any state has
nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, it
defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident, miscalculation
or design. And any such use would be catastrophic. It is sheer luck that the
world has escaped such catastrophe until now.
·
Maintaining the status quo is
not an option. The threats and risks associated with the failure to persuade
existing nuclear-armed states to disarm, to prevent new states acquiring
nuclear weapons, to stop any terrorist actor gaining access to such weapons,
and to properly manage a rapid expansion in civil nuclear energy, defy
complacency. They must be tackled with much more conviction and effectiveness
than the world has managed so far.
·
There have been many major
international commission, panel, research institute and think tank reports
addressing these issues. What makes this report distinctive is, hopefully, its
timeliness; comprehensiveness; global consultative reach; attention to
pragmatic realities as well as ambitious ideals; intended accessibility to
non-specialist policymakers; and strong action orientation, reflected in the
short, medium and longer term action agendas that bind together its specific
policy proposals.
·
With new U.S. and
Russian leadership seriously committed to disarmament action, there is a new
opportunity – the first since the immediate post-World War II and post-Cold War
years – to halt, and reverse, the nuclear weapons tide once and for all. This
report describes, not just rhetorically but in the detail that global
policymakers need, how that opportunity can and should be seized. [Section 1]
B.
NUCLEAR THREATS AND RISKS
·
Existing
Nuclear-Armed States. Twenty years after the end
of the Cold War there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence,
with a combined blast capacity equivalent to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs. The U.S. and Russia
together have over 22,000, and France ,
the UK , China , India ,
Pakistan and Israel around
1,000 between them. Nearly half of all warheads are still operationally
deployed, and the U.S. and Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on dangerously
high alert, ready to be launched immediately – within a decision window of just
4-8 minutes for each president – in the event of perceived attack. The command
and control systems of the Cold War years were repeatedly strained by mistakes
and false alarms. With more nuclear-armed states now, and more system
vulnerabilities, the near miracle of no nuclear exchange cannot continue in
perpetuity. [Section 2]
·
New
Nuclear-Armed States. The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system has been under severe strain in recent
years, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) struggling with
verification, compliance and enforcement failures, and backward steps occurring
in the world’s most volatile regions. India
and Pakistan joined the
undeclared Israel as
fully-fledged nuclear-armed states in 1998; North
Korea is now likely to have some half-dozen nuclear
explosive devices; and Iran
probably now has weapon-making capability, with real potential for generating a
regional proliferation surge should it choose to cross the weaponization
red-line. [Section
3]
·
Nuclear
Terrorism. Terrorist groups exist with the
intent, and capacity, to create massive nuclear destruction. With manageable
technology long in the public domain, and black market sourcing, a
Hiroshima-sized nuclear device could possibly be detonated from a truck or
small boat inside any major city. A “dirty bomb”, combining conventional
explosives with radioactive materials like medical isotopes, would be a much
easier option: while not generating anything like the casualties of a fission
or fusion bomb, it would have a psychological impact at least equal to 9/11. [Section 4]
·
Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy. The likely rapid
expansion of civil nuclear energy in the decades ahead, not least in response
to climate-change concerns, will present some additional proliferation and
security risks. Particularly if accompanied by the construction of new national
facilities for enrichment at the front end of the fuel cycle and reprocessing
at the back end, it could mean a great deal more fissile material becoming
potentially available for destructive purposes. [Section 5]
C.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
BASIC THEMES
·
Delegitimizing nuclear
weapons.
The critical need is to finally transform
perceptions of the role and utility of nuclear weapons, from occupying a
central place in strategic thinking to being seen as quite marginal, and
ultimately wholly unnecessary. There are good answers to all the familiar
deterrence and other justifications for retaining nuclear weapons.
·
It is neither defensible nor
sustainable for some states to argue that nuclear weapons are an indispensable,
legitimate and open-ended guarantor of their own and allies’ security, but that
others have no right to acquire them to protect their own perceived security
needs.
·
“Extended deterrence” does not
have to mean extended nuclear deterrence. [Section 6]
·
A phased approach. Achieving
a nuclear weapon free world will be a long, complex and formidably difficult
process, most realistically pursued as a two-phase process, with minimization
the immediate goal and elimination the ultimate one. [Section 7]
·
Short term (to 2012) and medium
term (to 2025) efforts should focus on achieving as soon as possible, and no
later than 2025, a “minimization point” characterised by very low numbers of
warheads (less than 10 per cent of present arsenals), agreed “no
first use” doctrine, and force deployments and alert status reflecting that
doctrine. [Sections
17, 18]
·
Analysis and debate should
commence now on the conditions necessary to move from the minimization point to
elimination, even if a target date for getting to zero cannot at this stage be
credibly specified.
[Section 19]
KEY POLICIES
·
Action Consensus. The
2010 NPT Review Conference should agree on a 20-point statement, “A New
International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament”, updating and
extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000. [16.6-11; Box 16-1 ]
·
Numbers. No later than
2025 U.S.
and Russian arsenals should be reduced to a total of 500 nuclear warheads each,
with at least no increases, and desirably significant reductions, in the
arsenals – now totalling some 1,000 warheads – of the other nuclear-armed
states. A global maximum of 2,000 warheads would represent a more than 90 per
cent reduction in present arsenals. [ 18.1-3]
·
All nuclear-armed states should
now explicitly commit not to increase the number of their nuclear weapons. [17.15-16]
· Doctrine. Pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, every
nuclear-armed state should make as soon as possible, and no later than 2025, an
unequivocal “no first use” (NFU) declaration. [17.28]
· If not prepared to go so far now, each such state – and in
particular the U.S.
in its Nuclear Posture Review – should at the very least accept the principle
that the “sole purpose” of possessing nuclear weapons is to deter others from
using such weapons against that state or its allies.
· Allied states affected by such declarations should be given firm
assurances that they will not be exposed to other unacceptable risks, including
from biological and chemical weapons. [17.28-32]
· New and unequivocal negative security assurances (NSAs) should be
given by all nuclear-armed states, supported by binding Security Council
resolution, that they will not use nuclear weapons against NPT-compliant
non-nuclear weapon states. [17.33-39]
·
Force Deployment and Alert Status. Changes should be made as soon as possible to ensure that, while
remaining demonstrably survivable to a disarming first strike, nuclear forces
are not instantly useable. Stability should be maximized by deployments and
launch alert status being transparent. [7.12-15; 17.40-50]
·
The decision-making fuse for
the launch of any nuclear weapons must be lengthened, and weapons taken off
launch-on-warning alert as soon as possible. [17.43]
·
Parallel Security Issues. Missile defence should be revisited, with a view to allowing the further
development of theatre ballistic missile defence systems, including potential
joint operations in areas of mutual concern, but setting severe limits on
strategic ballistic missile defences. [2.30-34; 18.28-30]
·
Conventional arms imbalances,
both quantitative and qualitative, between the nuclear-armed states, and in
particular the relative scale of U.S. capability, need to be
seriously addressed if this issue is not to become a significant impediment to future
bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. [18.34-36]
·
Continuing strong efforts
should be made to develop more effective ways of defending against potential biological attacks including building a workable verification regime, and to
promote universal adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention. [17.29; 18.32-33]
·
Ongoing attempts to prevent an
arms race in outer
space (PAROS )
should be strongly supported. [18.31]
·
Testing. All states that
have not already done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) unconditionally and without delay. U.S.
ratification is a critically needed circuit-breaker: it would have an immediate
impact on other hold-out states, and add major new momentum to both disarmament
and non-proliferation efforts.
·
Pending the CTBT’s entry into
force, all states should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. [Section 11]
·
Availability of Fissile Material. All nuclear-armed states should declare or maintain a moratorium on
the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the negotiation
and entry into force as soon as possible of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT).
·
On the question of pre-existing
stocks, a phased approach should be adopted, with the first priority a cap on
production; then an effort to ensure that all fissile material other than in
weapons becomes subject to irreversible, verified non-explosive use
commitments; and with fissile material released through dismantlement being
brought under these commitments as weapon reductions are agreed.
·
As an interim step, all
nuclear-armed states should voluntarily declare their fissile material stocks
and the amount they regard as excess to their weapons needs, place such excess
material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable, and convert it as soon
as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. [Section 12]
D.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NON-PROLIFERATION
BASIC THEMES
·
Nuclear
non-proliferation efforts should focus both on the demand side – persuading
states that nuclear weapons will not advance their national security or other
interests – and the supply side, through maintaining and strengthening a
comprehensive array of measures designed to make it as difficult as possible
for states to buy or build such weapons.
[Section 8]
[Section 8]
KEY POLICIES
·
NPT Safeguards and Verification. All states should accept the application of the IAEA Additional
Protocol. To encourage universal take-up, acceptance of it should be a condition
of all nuclear exports. [9.7]
· The Additional Protocol and its annexes should be updated and
strengthened to make clear the IAEA’s right to investigate possible
weaponization activity, and by adding specific reference to dual-use items,
reporting on export denials, shorter notice periods and the right to interview
specific individuals. [9.8-9]
·
NPT Compliance and Enforcement. In determining compliance, the IAEA should confine itself
essentially to technical criteria, applying them with consistency and
credibility, and leaving the political consequences for the Security Council to
determine. [9.15]
·
The UN Security Council should
severely discourage withdrawal from the NPT by making it clear that this will
be regarded as prima facie a threat to international peace and security, with
all the punitive consequences that may follow from that under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. [9.20]
·
A state withdrawing from the
NPT should not be free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials,
equipment and technology acquired while party to the NPT. Any such material
provided before withdrawal should so far as possible be returned, with this
being enforced by the Security Council. [9.21-22]
·
Strengthening the IAEA.
The IAEA should make full use of the authority already available to it,
including special inspections, and states should be prepared to strengthen its
authority as deficiencies are identified. [9.24]
·
The IAEA should be given a
one-off injection of funds to refurbish the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory; a
significant increase in its regular budget support, without a “zero real
growth” constraint; and sufficient security of future funding to enable
effective medium to long term planning. [9.25-27]
·
Non-NPT Treaties and Mechanisms. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop a criteria-based
approach to cooperation agreements with states outside the NPT, taking into
account factors such as ratification of the CTBT, willingness to end
unsafeguarded fissile material production, and states’ record in securing
nuclear facilities and materials and controlling nuclear-related exports. [10.3-9]
·
The Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system as a neutral
organization to assess intelligence, coordinate and fund activities, and make
both generic and specific recommendations or decisions concerning the
interdiction of suspected materials being carried to or from countries of
proliferation concern. [10.10-12]
·
Extending Obligations to Non-NPT States. Recognising the reality that the three nuclear-armed states now
outside the NPT – India , Pakistan and Israel – are not likely to become
members any time soon, every effort should be made to achieve their
participation in parallel instruments and arrangements which apply equivalent
non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. [10.13-16]
·
Provided they satisfy strong objective criteria demonstrating commitment to
disarmament and non-proliferation, and sign up to specific future commitments
in this respect, these states should have access to nuclear materials and
technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an NPT member. [10.17]
·
These states should participate
in multilateral disarmament negotiations on the same basis as the
nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT, and not be expected to accept
different treatment because of their non-membership of that treaty. [10.18]
· Priorities for
the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The primary
focus should be on reaching agreement on:
Ø
a new 20-point statement, “A
New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament”, updating and
extending the “Thirteen Practical Steps” agreed in 2000;
Ø
measures to strengthen NPT
safeguards and verification, compliance and enforcement, and the IAEA (as
above);
Ø
forward movement on the Middle
East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, with the UN Secretary-General
convening an early conference of all relevant states to address creative and
fresh ways to implement the 1995 resolution;
Ø
strengthened implementation of
nuclear security measures (see Meeting Terrorism Challenge below); and
Ø
further support for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. [Section 16]
E.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
BASIC THEMES
·
Effectively countering
terrorism of any kind involves a complex mix of nationally and internationally
coordinated protection and policing strategies (most immediately important in
dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism), and also political,
peacebuilding and psychological strategies (necessary to address the underlying
causes of terrorist behaviour).
· At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, and in related policy
deliberations, the main need is to focus on the effective implementation of
existing agreed measures rather than the development of new ones. [Section 13; Box 13-1 ]
KEY POLICIES
·
All states should agree to take
effective measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and
facilities, including by adopting and implementing the 2005 amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, accelerating
delivery of the Cooperative Threat Reduction and associated programs worldwide,
and making a greater commitment to international capacity building and
information sharing. [13.5-16]
·
On the control of material
useable for “dirty bombs”, further efforts need to be made to cooperatively
implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources, with assistance to states in updating legislation and licensing
practice and promoting awareness among users.[13.17-21]
·
Strong support should be given
to the emerging science of nuclear forensics, designed to identify the sources
of materials found in illicit trafficking or used in nuclear explosions. [13.22-25]
F.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY
BASIC THEMES
·
The use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes should continue to be strongly supported as one of the three
fundamental pillars of the NPT, along with disarmament and non-proliferation.
Increased resources should be provided, including through the IAEA’s Technical
Cooperation Programme, to assist developing states in taking full advantage of
peaceful nuclear energy for human development.
·
Proliferation resistance should
be endorsed by governments and industry as an essential objective in the design
and operation of nuclear facilities, and promoted through both institutional
and technical measures – neither is sufficient without the other. [Section 14]
KEY POLICIES
·
Nuclear Energy Management. Support should be given to the initiative launched at the 2008
Hokkaido Toyako G8 Summit for international cooperation on nuclear energy
infrastructure, designed to raise awareness worldwide of the importance of the
three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist countries concerned in
developing the relevant measures. [14.4-6]
·
New technologies for spent fuel
treatment should be developed to avoid current forms of reprocessing
altogether. [12.26]
·
The increasing use of plutonium
recycle, and the prospective introduction of fast neutron reactors, must be
pursued in ways which enhance non-proliferation objectives and avoid adding to
proliferation and terrorism risks. [14.9-15]
·
International measures such as
spent fuel take-back arrangements by fuel suppliers, are desirable to avoid
increasing spent fuel accumulations in a large number of states. [14.13]
·
Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle – in particular through fuel banks and multilateral management of
enrichment, reprocessing and spent fuel storage facilities – should be strongly
supported. Such arrangements would play an invaluable role in building global
confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provide an important
foundation for a world free of nuclear weapons, for which a necessary
requirement will be multilateral verification and control of all sensitive fuel
cycle activities. [Section
15]
G.
MOBILIZING AND SUSTAINING POLITICAL WILL
BASIC THEMES
·
The will to do something
difficult, sensitive or expensive will rarely be a given in international or
domestic politics. It usually has to be painfully and laboriously constructed,
case by case, context by context, with four main elements needing to come
together:
Ø
leadership: without which
inertia will always prevail – top down (from the major nuclear-armed states,
particularly the U.S. and Russia ), from
peer groups (like-minded states worldwide) and bottom up (from civil society);
Ø
knowledge: both specialist and
general, of the nature, magnitude and urgency of the nuclear problem: requiring
better education and training in schools and universities, and stronger
advocacy directed to policymakers, and those in the media and elsewhere who
most influence them;
Ø
strategy: having a confident
sense that there is a productive way forward: not just general objectives, but
realistic action plans with detailed paths mapped and target benchmarks set;
and
Ø
process: having the
institutional and organisational means at hand – “campaign treaties”, or other
research and advocacy structures – to advance the relevant strategy in
practice. [Section
20]
KEY POLICIES
·
Nuclear Weapons Convention. Work should commence now, supported by interested governments, on
further refining and developing the concepts in the model convention now in
circulation, making its provisions as workable and realistic as possible, with
the objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and
guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum. [20.38-44]
·
Report Card. To help
sustain political will over time, a regular “report card” should be published
in which a distinguished international panel, with appropriately professional
and broad based research support, would evaluate the performance of both
nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states against the action agendas
identified in this report. [20.49-50]
· Monitoring and
Advocacy Centre. Consideration should be given
to the establishment of a “Global Centre on Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament” to act as a focal point and clearing house for the work being done
on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues by many different
institutions and organizations in many different countries, to provide research
and advocacy support both for like-minded governments and for civil society
organisations, and to prepare the “report card” described above. [20.51-54]
THE COMPREHENSIVE ACTION AGENDA
THE SHORT TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2012:
ACHIEVING INITIAL BENCHMARKS
On Disarmament
·
Early agreement on a Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on treaty, with the U.S. and Russia agreeing to deep reductions
in deployed strategic weapons, addressing the issue of strategic missile
defence and commencing negotiations on further deep cuts in all classes of
weapons.
·
Early movement on nuclear
doctrine, with all nuclear-armed states declaring at least that the sole
purpose of retaining the nuclear weapons they have is to deter others from
using such weapons against them or their allies (while giving firm assurances
to such allies that they will not be exposed to unacceptable risk from other
sources, including in particular chemical and biological weapons).
·
All nuclear-armed states to
give strong negative security assurances to complying non-nuclear weapon states
parties to the NPT, supported by binding Security Council resolution, that they
will not use nuclear weapons against them.
·
Early action on nuclear force
postures, with particular attention to the negotiated removal to the extent
possible of weapons from “launch-on-warning” status.
·
Early commitment by all
nuclear-armed states to not increasing their nuclear arsenals.
·
Prepare the ground for a
multilateral disarmament process by all nuclear-armed states conducting
relevant studies; engaging in strategic dialogues with the U.S. , Russia and each other; and
commencing a joint dialogue within the framework of the Conference on
Disarmament work program.
On
Non-Proliferation
·
A positive outcome for the May
2010 NPT Review Conference, with member states reaching agreement on measures
to strengthen the NPT regime, including improved safeguards, verification,
compliance and enforcement; measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA;
“A New International Consensus for Action on Nuclear Disarmament” statement on
disarmament issues; and measures to advance the implementation of the Middle
East and other existing and proposed Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.
·
Satisfactory negotiated
resolution of the North Korea
and Iran
nuclear program problems.
·
Movement toward strengthening
non-proliferation regimes outside the NPT, and applying equivalent disciplines
to NPT non-members.
On Both
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
·
Bring into force the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
·
Conclude negotiations on an
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
On Nuclear
Security
·
Bring into force the 2005
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
accelerate implementation of the cooperative threat reduction and associated
programs designed to secure dangerous nuclear weapons, materials and technology
worldwide, and achieve greater commitment to international capacity building
and information sharing.
On Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Energy
·
Movement toward greater
multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and government-industry
cooperation on proliferation-resistant technologies and other measures designed
to reduce any risks associated with the expansion of civil nuclear energy.
·
Promotion of international
cooperation on nuclear energy infrastructure to raise awareness worldwide of
the importance of the three Ss – safeguards, security and safety – and assist
countries concerned in developing relevant measures.
[Section
17]
THE MEDIUM TERM ACTION AGENDA TO 2025:
GETTING TO THE MINIMIZATION POINT
GETTING TO THE MINIMIZATION POINT
·
Progressive achievement of
interim disarmament objectives, culminating by 2025 in a “minimization point”
characterized by:
Ø
low numbers: a world with no
more than 2,000 nuclear warheads (less than 10 per cent of today’s arsenals);
Ø
agreed doctrine: every
nuclear-armed state committed to no first use;
Ø
credible force postures:
verifiable deployments and alert status reflecting that doctrine.
·
Progressive resolution of
parallel security issues likely to impact on nuclear disarmament negotiations:
Ø
missile delivery systems and
strategic missile defence;
Ø
space based weapons systems;
Ø
biological weapons;
Ø
conventional arms imbalances.
·
Development and building of
support for a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention to legally underpin the
ultimate transition to a nuclear weapon free world.
·
Complete implementation (to
extent already not achieved by 2012) of short‑term objectives
crucial for both disarmament and non‑proliferation:
Ø
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty in force;
Ø
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
negotiated and in force, and a further agreement negotiated to put all fissile
material not in weapons under international safeguards;
Ø
Measures to strengthen the NPT
regime and the IAEA agreed and in force;
Ø
Nuclear security measures in
force, and cooperative threat reduction and associated programs fully
implemented;
Ø
Progressive implementation of
measures to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of
civil nuclear energy.
[Section 18]
THE LONGER TERM ACTION AGENDA BEYOND 2025:
GETTING TO ZERO
GETTING TO ZERO
·
Create political conditions,
regionally and globally, sufficiently cooperative and stable for the prospect
of major war or aggression to be so remote that nuclear weapons are seen as
having no remaining deterrent utility.
·
Create the military conditions
in which conventional arms imbalances, missile defence systems or any other
national or intergovernmental-organisation capability is not seen as so
inherently destabilizing as to justify the retention of a nuclear deterrent
capability.
·
Create verification conditions
that will ensure confidence that any violation of the prohibition of nuclear
weapons would be readily detected.
·
Create the international legal
regime and enforcement conditions that will ensure that any state breaching its
prohibition obligations not to retain, acquire or develop nuclear weapons will
be effectively penalized.
·
Create fuel cycle management
conditions that will ensure complete confidence that no state has the capacity
to misuse uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing for weapons development
purposes.
·
Create personnel oversight
conditions to ensure confidence that individuals’ know-how in the design and
building of nuclear weapons will not be misapplied in violation of prohibition
obligations.
[Section 19]
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