Emergency preparedness capability that will:
- Ensure that security and emergency preparedness are addressed during all phases of operation, including the hiring and training of personnel; the procurement and maintenance of equipment; the development of policies, rules, and procedures; and coordination with appropriate federal, state, and local public safety and community emergency planning agencies.
- Promote analysis tools and methodologies to encourage safe operation through the identification, evaluation and resolution of threats and vulnerabilities, and the on-going assessment of company capabilities and readiness.
- Create a culture that supports employee safety and security and safe operation (during normal and emergency conditions) through motivated compliance with company rules and procedures and the appropriate use and operation of equipment.
- Assist the company in adhering to governmental guidelines, rules and regulations that promote transportation security.
- Achieve a level of security performance and emergency readiness that meets or exceeds the operating experience of similarly-sized operations around the nation
- Increase and strengthen community involvement and participation in the safety and security of our operation
- Develop and implement an assessment program, and based on the results of this program, establish a course of action for improving physical security measures and emergency response capabilities to manage the identified risks.
- Expand our training program for employees, volunteers, first responders, and contractors to address security awareness and emergency management issues
- Enhance our coordination with applicable local, state and federal agencies regarding security and emergency preparedness issues
Terrorist Operations
Operational Acts Needed to Carry Out an Attack
In fact, surveillance is only one step in a sequence of
operational acts that a terrorist must complete in order to execute a
successful attack. These steps are:
- Targeting—terrorists first must identify a target based on their primary objectives or motivations. This could include actions designed to inflict huge casualties or significant economic disruption, attacks on facilities or buildings with significant iconic value, such as monuments, and/or actions that will result in high media exposure. Your operation may provide terrorists the equipment or materials needed to attack their target.
- Casing—this is the careful development of the terrorists’ plan of attack. They will think through all the steps needed to carry out an attack and what countermeasures might stop them. They may try to get copies of your security procedures or plan.
- Surveillance—a close observation of the elements of their plan. They may watch a facility to determine how many visitors, deliveries, and employees come and go and how often. Is there a regular pattern, such as during shift changes?
- Rehearsal—rarely do terrorists carry out an attack without first testing out their plan. They may stop in front of a truck to see what the driver does. They may set off your perimeter motion-detection system to test your response time.
- Attack—looks just like a rehearsal, except it doesn’t end the same way. The goal of a security plan is to develop sufficient security measures to prevent them from getting to this stage at all!
. The list is not
exhaustive, but provides examples of suspicious activity for which passenger
carriers and their employees should be alert:
- Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points and access controls, or perimeter barriers, such as fences or walls;
- Unusual behavior, such as staring or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving designated facilities or parking areas;
- Increase in anonymous telephone or e-mail threats to facilities in conjunction with suspected surveillance incidents—indicating possible surveillance of threat reaction procedures;
- Foot surveillance involving two or three individuals working together;
- Mobile surveillance using bicycles, scooters, motorcycles, cars, trucks, or small aircraft;
- Prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, demonstrators, shoe shiners, food or flower vendors, news agents, or street sweepers not previously seen in the area;
- Discreet use of still cameras, video recorders or note taking at non-tourist type locations;
- Use of multiple sets of clothing, identifications, or the use of sketching materials (paper, pencils, etc.); and
- Questioning of security or facility personnel
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Assessing and Managing Risk: A PrimerThe relative value of a potential target can have a major effect on the likelihood of attack. Terrorists will set goals for an attack, such as casualties and economic disruption, or they may choose a target for its symbolic importance. Obviously, a larger relative value for one potential target over another makes it more likely that the site will be attacked. Changes in the relative value of other sites could change the risk of terrorism at a particular site, even if no change has occurred at the site itself.Components of Terrorism RiskØ General Definition of Risk – Risk is simply the likelihood of an event occurring multiplied by the estimated consequence of that event.Based on this equation, a risk represents the expected outcome over a period of time of some uncertain event.LikelihoodIn assessing the risk of terrorism, the likelihood of occurrence is the product of two components: the likelihood of an attack occurring (threat) and the likelihood of that attack being successful (vulnerability).Likelihood = (Threat) x (Vulnerability)Ø Threat – The likelihood of an attack occurring is referred to as the threat. If we were to measure this factor in absolute terms, the threat would be equal to the probability of an attack or the frequency of attack on an asset. However, because it is in many instances difficult—if not impossible—to estimate these factors for terrorist attacks, threat must be evaluated on a relative scale.In this type of analysis, the likelihood of a particular type of attack occurring is driven by two factors: plausibility of attack (i.e., the overall likelihood of a certain type attack occurring, regardless of target) and target attractiveness (i.e., the likelihood that a certain asset would be targeted for that type of attack).Threat = f (plausibility, target attractiveness)Plausibility could be driven by a number of factors, including:· Difficulty in obtaining the type of weapon· Difficulty in transporting and using the weapon· Presence of potential threat elements (PTE) in the geographic area· Past history of attacks· Specific intelligence.Target attractiveness measures the features of a particular asset that may make it more or less likely to be targeted by terrorists for a particular form of attack. Evaluation of target attractiveness should include an evaluation of two sets of features: target value and deterrence. Target value evaluates those features of an asset that make it more likely to be attacked or that make it attractive as a target. These may include potential for casualties, potential for economic disruption, and symbolic importance. Deterrence evaluates those features that make a target less likely to be attacked, including security and response capabilities.Ø Vulnerability – The likelihood of an attack being executed successfully is referred to as the vulnerability. In determining the vulnerability of an attack, it is assumed that the asset has been targeted, the terrorists have the required weapon and equipment, and the attack will take place. Vulnerability measures the probability that the attack will achieve its desired result. The desired result in this case is successful completion of the attack, not the desired results in terms of damage or casualties.ConsequenceThe consequence of a terrorist attack is a function of the total value of the asset (the maximum potential consequence) and the impact that an attack would have on that value. The asset value is sometimes referred to as the criticality of the asset.Consequence = f (Criticality, Attack Impact)Ø Criticality – Criticality is defined by the maximum potential consequence that an attack could have. This value represents the aspects or features of an asset that would make someone want to protect it. Generally, criticality is defined using a set of “Critical Asset Factors.” These factors define the features of an asset that could make it important to protect. Typical critical asset factors include:· Potential for casualties· Potential economic disruption· National strategic importance· Potential for environmental impact.Ø Attack Impact – Criticality serves as the “yardstick” against which consequence can be measured. The evaluation of the criticality of an asset measures the greatest potential consequence of any attack on an asset from the perspective of the assessor. However, not all forms of attack would eliminate this importance. For example; a “backpack” type bomb may kill or injure a number of people at a train station but would not kill everyone in the station or destroy the station itself. For this reason, an evaluation of the expected impact of an attack scenario is completed to determine the portion of asset value that would likely be destroyed. The portion of the asset value is the consequence of the attack.The evaluation of impact must be tied to the critical asset factors that are used to define criticality. For each asset and critical asset factor, the degree to which the contribution of that asset is destroyed is assessed.Risk AssessmentThe basic equations presented above define the factors that must be included in an assessment of risk. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between these factors.Three basic components of risk must be evaluated to calculate the level of terrorism risk associated with an attack on a particular asset:· Threat· Vulnerability· Consequence
Response CapabilitiesIt is now appropriate to review key components of planning for and responding to scenarios and/or a terrorism event. A key element of this is identifying local capacities for a response. Often this involves a meeting between agencies who, in the event of an incident, will have to work together to address the incident. Dedication and commitment are crucial to pre- and post-event planning. The following are key considerations for those professionals and the respective disciplines in which they serve:Ø Staffing and Personnel – Field and supervisory staff must understand their responsibilities as non-traditional emergency first responders following a terrorist incident. This understanding includes the ability to: recognize that an emergency has occurred; initiate an emergency response either directly to 911 dispatch or through the agency control center; evacuate the service vehicle in an efficient manner; and secure the service vehicle, preventing bystanders from entering a potentially hazardous scene. Service providers should review staff responsibilities following emergency events and ensure a clear understanding of policies and procedures.Ø Training – All staff with assignments and responsibilities in operations and/or communications should have appropriate weapons of mass destruction awareness training. This training should provide the necessary education and information to ensure the safety of staff and riders. Additionally, field supervisors are typically expected to provide critical technical representation in an incident command system situation. Incident command and management training is essential in establishing the required knowledge base to provide seamless technical support following an emergency, in addition to providing staff leadership and control. Senior safety and security managers may want to consider the online National Incident Management System (NIMS) training, which will help them gain a perspective on their roles and responsibilities during a response.Ø Exercise, Evaluation, and Corrective Actions – Motor coach service providers should participate in local, regional, state, and federally sponsored exercises in addition to company-specific events. This participation will provide an environment to initiate networking opportunities, as well as respond to emergency response agency assumptions and potential false premises. In addition, appropriate training in “real-life” situations will instill staff policies and procedures and validate operational plans, policies, and procedures. It is imperative that service providers view their system not only as a point of attack but also as a means for assisting in response to an attack. The use of various elements of the transportation sector for triage, evacuation, and all facets of emergency response is a key element of consequence management. -
Glossary of Terms
Critical Incidents:Accidents, natural disasters, crimes, terrorism, sabotage, civil unrest, hazardous materials spills, service interruptions, power outages and other events that require emergency response. Critical incidents require swift, decisive action from multiple organizations, often under stressful conditions. Critical incidents must be stabilized prior to the resumption of regular service or activities.Emergency:A situation which is life threatening to passengers, employees, or other interested citizens or which causes damage to any company vehicle or facility or results in the significant theft of services and reduces the ability of the company to fulfill its mission.Emergency Preparedness:A uniform basis for operating policies and procedures for mobilizing company and other public safety resources to assure rapid, controlled, and predictable responses to various types of operational emergencies.Fatality:An operation caused death that occurs within 30 days of the incident.Injury:Any physical damage or harm to a person that requires immediate medical attention and hospitalization.Operation:A composite of people (employees, passengers, others), property (facilities and equipment), environment (physical, social, institutional), and procedures (standard operating, emergency operating, and training) integrated to deliver an intended service or function in a specific environment.Operation security:The application of operating, technical, and management techniques and principles to the security aspects of company operations to reduce threats and vulnerabilities to the most practical level through the most effective use of available resources.Operation securitymanagement:An element of management that defines the operation security requirements and ensures the planning, implementation, and accomplishments of operation security tasks and activities.Operations securityProgram:The combined tasks and activities of security management and security analysis that enhance operational effectiveness by satisfying the security requirements in a timely and cost-effective manner through all phases of an operation life cycle.Safety:Freedom from danger.Secure areas:Locations within facilities that because of equipment locations, information or materials stored, or operations conducted, are restricted to access by selected individuals and/or at specific times.Security:Freedom from intentional dangerSecurity breach:An unforeseen event or occurrence that endangers life or property and may result in the loss of services or equipment.Security Committee:Persons selected by the Company to review, oversee, and provide guidance/direction for security procedures and activities.Security incident:An unforeseen event or occurrence that does not necessarily result in death, injury, or significant property damage but may result in minor loss of revenue.Security threat:Any source that may result in a security breach, such as a vandal or a disgruntled passenger or employee; or an activity, such as an assault, intrusion, fire, etc.Threat:Any real or potential condition that can cause injury or death to passengers or employees or the motoring public or damage to or loss of company equipment, property, and/or facilities.Threat analysis:A systematic analysis of operations performed to identify threats and make recommendations for their elimination or mitigation during all activities.Threat probability:The probability a threat will occur during the plan's life. Threat probability may be expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms. An example of a threat-probability ranking system is as follows: (a) frequent, (b) probable, (c) occasional, (d) remote, (e) improbable, and (f) impossible.Threat resolution:The analysis and subsequent action taken to reduce the risks associated with an identified threat to the lowest practical level.Threat severity:A qualitative measure of the worst possible consequences of a specific threat:· Catastrophic. May cause death or loss of a significant component of the operation, or significant financial loss.· Critical. May cause severe injury, severe illness, major damage, or major financial loss.· Marginal. May cause minor injury or damage, or financial loss.· Negligible. Will not result in injury, damage, or financial loss.Unsafe condition/ act:Any condition or act that endangers life or property.Vulnerability:Characteristics of passengers, employees, vehicles, and/or facilities that increase the probability of a security breach.
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